By John Hollinger | The Athletic, 2026-05-05 09:30:08
曾有人向我描述过一个NBA球队管理层会议的场景。那是十多年前的事了，但其中的情节对业内人士来说并不陌生，且至今仍与当下的讨论息息相关。
在那次会议上，一位总经理正在勾勒一个极其复杂的“快速致富”交易方案，这套方案看起来既风险极高，又不太可能产生丰厚回报（事实证明确实如此）。这时，一名职级较低的员工提出了一个简单的问题：“如果我们只是尝试引进优秀的球员并以此建设球队，会怎么样？”
当然，这名员工被哄出了房间。但在我们谈论球队重建方式时，这个问题依然被轻视。
在很大程度上，我们正处于一个更聪明的新时代，但选秀抽签依然是终极的“投机者方案”。只要你自降身段，进行为期五年左右的彻底拆解，期间至少有三年打出18胜64负的战绩，也许联盟就会把维克托·文班亚马 (Victor Wembanyama) 送到你手上作为奖励。
有趣的是，除了圣安东尼奥马刺队，摆烂者们并没有真正统治联盟。这也是我极其看好联盟提议的选秀抽签改革的原因之一。这项改革将彻底消除任何摆烂动机，并让赛季最后两个月那惨不忍睹的赛场表现焕发新生。
其代价是，一些管理层觉得失去了一个工具：即通过明目张胆的摆烂来获取选中顶级天赋球员的机会。有人认为这会对小市场球队造成沉重打击，因为他们不是自由球员（或者更现实地说，是“自由市场前的交易申请”）的目的地。
所以，在讨论NBA选秀抽签改革之前，让我们先聊聊2025年NBA总决赛。对阵双方是联盟中两个最小、最不起眼的城市……而且，这场对决几乎不依赖摆烂或高顺位选秀权就达成了结果。
- 场上最出色的球员是谢伊·吉尔杰斯-亚历山大 (Shai Gilgeous-Alexander)，他是2018年选秀的第11顺位，在选秀当晚和一年后分别被交易过。
- 场上第二好的球员是泰瑞斯·哈利伯顿 (Tyrese Haliburton)，他是2020年选秀的第12顺位，在不到两年后被交易。
- 场上第三好的球员是杰伦·威廉姆斯 (Jalen Williams)，他是2022年选秀的第12顺位，此前他的球队在第11顺位选择了奥斯曼·吉昂 (Ousmane Dieng)，而杰伦则是用另一支球队的选秀权选中的。
- 场上第四好的球员是帕斯卡尔·西亚卡姆 (Pascal Siakam)，2016年选秀的第27顺位，同样是通过交易获得的。
虽然俄克拉荷马城雷霆队确实受益于一个令人侧目的摆烂赛季，并以此得到了切特·霍姆格伦 (Chet Holmgren)，但他们阵容的大部分是通过精明的交易、明智的末位选秀、搜罗吕冈茨·多尔特 (Lu Dort) 和赛亚·乔 (Isaiah Joe) 等自由球员，以及通过薪资空间管理在自由市场上签下赛亚·哈滕施泰因 (Isaiah Hartenstein) 建立起来的。这就是为什么他们在霍姆格伦仅出战32场比赛的赛季里，依然打出了68胜14负的战绩。
所以，是的，我并不担心改革对小市场球队的影响。至于其余部分，简直太棒了，我非常喜欢。
我会在下文讨论一些细节，但我真的非常兴奋，因为在3月的某个夜晚查看赛程时，我不用再把一半的比赛视为结果早已注定的走过场闹剧。这项改革还有一个额外的好处，那就是让联盟摆脱了“伪造伤病”的监管工作。如果你想让特雷·杨 (Trae Young) 提前休战，那是你的自由，但如果你最终排名倒数前三，你将不会因此得到奖励。
联盟提出的方案在消除明显的、“过程”式摆烂动机方面做得非常出色，同时也管理好了那些球队可能试图操纵排名的“关键节点”。
最大的潜在负面影响是它剥夺了管理层的摆烂选项。抱歉，我们真的要把这称为负面影响吗？让我们称之为它的真名：谢天谢地。
最新消息：在拥有跨时代天才的年份，依然会有球队获得状元签；他们并没有取消选秀。与此同时，把“做出明智举动并建设你的球队”作为应对策略如何？
再次强调，最让我对提议的改革感到焦虑的是一种潜在假设，即摆烂是小市场球队与大豪门竞争的唯一手段。是的，现行制度确实鼓励这种做法，而且这确实是获得跨时代天才最权宜的方式。
但那种认为顶级天赋需要球队在抽签之夜幸运地抽中前三顺位的假设，在近期的证据中并没有得到有力支持。过去七个MVP奖项中，有六个是由10顺位以外的球员获得的；只有乔尔·恩比德 (Joel Embiid) 在2023年的获奖打破了这一纪录，而如果吉尔杰斯-亚历山大再次蝉联，这一纪录将变成八年七次。
我们还可以进一步回顾2025年总决赛的例子。
- 2024年冠军波士顿凯尔特人队最好的两名球员是杰森·塔图姆 (Jayson Tatum) 和杰伦·布朗 (Jaylen Brown)，波士顿都是通过布鲁克林篮网队的选秀权获得的。
- 2023年总决赛场上最好的球员是尼古拉·约基奇 (Nikola Jokić)，他是2014年的第41顺位。第二好的球员是吉米·巴特勒 (Jimmy Butler)，2011年的第30顺位。迈阿密热火队的核心八人组中没有一名球员是前十顺位选中的。
- 2022年总决赛场上最好的球员是斯蒂芬·库里 (Steph Curry)，他是2008年的第7顺位。排在塔图姆和布朗之后的优秀球员是德雷蒙德·格林 (Draymond Green)（2012年第35顺位）和克莱·汤普森 (Klay Thompson)（2011年第11顺位）。
- 2021年总决赛场上最好的球员是扬尼斯·阿德托昆博 (Giannis Antetokounmpo)，他是2013年的第15顺位。小市场球队密尔沃基雄鹿队在夺冠过程中，只有一名球员是前14顺位选中的；那名球员是布鲁克鲁·洛佩斯 (Brook Lopez)，他是13年前由篮网队在第10顺位选中的。
- 系列赛中第二好的球员是德文·布克 (Devin Booker)，2015年的第13顺位。是的，那个系列赛中确实有一位状元秀——德安德烈·艾顿 (Deandre Ayton)，但太阳队在两年后就交易了他。
- 2020年总决赛最好的球员是勒布朗·詹姆斯 (LeBron James) 和安东尼·戴维斯 (Anthony Davis)……两人都是各自选秀年份的状元，但都不是由洛杉矶湖人队选中的。他们的对手迈阿密队没有一名球员是前十顺位选中的。
- 2019年总决赛最好的球员是科怀·伦纳德 (Kawhi Leonard)，他是2011年由马刺队选中的第15顺位。他也是多伦多猛龙全队唯一一位前20顺位选中的球员；猛龙队在总决赛中的第四得分手弗雷德·范弗利特 (Fred VanVleet) 是一名落选秀。
你必须一路追溯到2015年至2018年克利夫兰骑士队与金州勇士队之间的总决赛，才能找到摆烂带来的真正影响。骑士队抽中状元签并选中凯里·欧文 (Kyrie Irving)、勒布朗·詹姆斯（为他的回归铺路）以及安德鲁·维金斯 (Andrew Wiggins)（为交易凯文·乐福 (Kevin Love) 铺路），无疑是他们成功的首要因素。
所以，是的，获得高顺位选秀权确实可以作为球队重建的催化剂。顺位越高肯定越好，有时甚至是天差地别。
是的，获得高顺位选秀权对重建依然非常有帮助。问问马刺队和文班亚马就知道了。(Wendell Cruz / USA Today Sports)
然而显而易见的是，这远非建设一支强队的唯一途径，甚至不清楚这种痛苦是否值得回报。举个例子：犹他爵士队刚刚荒废了一位全明星球员四年的巅峰期，而他们目前能拿得出手的最好成果只是一个他们在第16顺位选中的球员。
那么，现在我应该谈谈具体的抽签改革方案了。我认为最需要强调的一点是，烂队在很大程度上依然拥有获得高顺位选秀权的最高概率。他们只是不必再花费半个赛季去操纵这个过程。
这是如何运作的？
在联盟提议的“3-2-1”抽签制度中，16支球队将参加抽签，并分别获得三个球、两个球或一个球。
- 战绩最差的三支球队将获得两个球
- 其他未进入附加赛的球队将获得三个球
- 参加9-10名附加赛的四支球队将获得两个球
- 每个分区7-8名附加赛的负者将获得一个球
此外：
- 抽签池中的所有16个顺位（不仅仅是前四名）都将通过随机抽取产生
- 战绩最差的三支球队选秀顺位不会低于第12位
- 交易中的选秀权保护不能设定在第12顺位至第15顺位之间
- 球队不能连续两年获得状元签
- 球队不能连续三年获得前五顺位选秀权
概率看起来如何？
在上述最后两条规则不适用的年份，拥有“三个球”的球队获得状元签的概率为8.1%，拥有“两个球”的球队为5.4%，拥有“一个球”的球队为2.7%。
在极端情况下，战绩第四差的球队有可能抽到第16顺位（3%的概率），或者7-8名附加赛的负者抽到状元签（2.7%的概率），亦或是战绩最差的三支球队分别抽到第10、11和12顺位（10.2%的概率）。是的，那确实运气太差了。
然而平均来看，整个频谱是非常公平的：战绩最差的三支球队与拥有“三个球”的其他球队相比，平均选秀顺位仅下降了0.7位，且依然比拥有“两个球”的其他球队好1.0位。拥有“一个球”的球队平均抽到第12顺位；也许他们会走运并顺位上移，但60%的情况下他们会抽到第13顺位或更靠后。
选秀抽签改革顺位概率 (%)
| 状元 | 前3 | 前5 | 前10 | 平均顺位 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 战绩最差三队 | 5.4 | 16 | 28 | 61 | 8.1 |
| “三个球”球队 | 8.1 | 24 | 39 | 73 | 7.4 |
| 9-10名球队 | 5.4 | 16 | 28 | 59 | 9.1 |
| 7-8名负者 | 2.7 | 8 | 15 | 35 | 11.7 |
如果其他球队不具备资格，这些平均值会略有变化。例如，如果我们在今年进行抽签，达拉斯独行侠队将没有资格赢得状元签，这将使其他每个抽签球获得状元的概率提高约0.2%。如果是在该制度下的2025年，圣安东尼奥将没有资格赢得榜眼签（或任何前五顺位），这将使其他每个抽签球获得前五顺位的概率提高约1%。
就摆烂而言，人们可能会担心一种理论上的（且极不可能发生的）情况：五支烂队因为在前两次抽签中已经中奖而失去了获得前五顺位的资格，从而引发其他球队冲向倒数前十的热潮。除此之外，很难找到钻系统漏洞的空间。
为什么要针对垫底球队？
降低最差三支球队抽签概率的动力是为了提高赛场产品的质量。简单来说，“努力赢球”和“不公然求败”之间存在巨大差异，联盟正试图消除这种差异，让犹他与孟菲斯之间的一场4月比赛依然具有意义和影响。我认为显而易见的是，这会比看着贝兹·姆本 (Bez Mbeng) 对阵一群穿着灰熊球衣的随机路人并砍下三双要好看得多。
此外，排名垫底球队之间的所谓“保级战”可能会提供另一层赛季末的娱乐性，尽管对于那些已经交易了无保护选秀权的球队来说，这些比赛的意义较小。（你好，鹈鹕队！）
不幸的副作用是，排名垫底将成为一种耻辱。现实地说，管理层和教练需要大量的内部信任才能在这样的赛季中幸存下来。我理解为什么人们对这部分内容有些担忧。
虽然这对联盟垫底的三支球队来说可能感觉有些不公平，但让我们分清主次。更大的目标是联盟必须保护其产品，而适度降低垫底球队的抽签概率似乎是实现这一目标相当关键的组成部分。
球队会为了选秀权故意掉出第七名，或掉出附加赛吗？
根据最近的证据，我对此深表怀疑。输掉7-8名的比赛会给你带来2.7%的状元概率和11%的前四概率。而跌出前十名则会在状元概率上再增加2.7%，在前四概率上再增加11%。
有人认为，一支球队可能会输掉7-8名的比赛，但通过赢得下一场主场比赛仍有很大机会进入季后赛；或者，一支有竞争附加赛资格的球队可能不会费心去争取第10名，以增加类似的概率。我认为这在现实中不太可能发生，因为联盟设置的“概率断层”足够小，足以降低这种诱惑。
最值得注意的是，今年有两支球队面临类似的提升概率的机会，但从未考虑过放弃。
金州勇士和波特兰开拓者在进入附加赛时，如果出局，都会获得与上述类似的概率调整。勇士队最终失利时获得了2.0%的状元概率和9.4%的前四概率，但在那之前，他们在9-10名的比赛中曾从第四节落后13分的情况下逆转战胜了洛杉矶快船。当勇士队输球时，他们的预期选秀顺位从第15位提升了四位，到了第11位。
与此同时，波特兰本可以继承同样的概率，但如果赢球，他们将彻底失去选秀权。然而开拓者依然开赴菲尼克斯，在7-8名的比赛中击败了太阳。（波特兰欠公牛队一个前14顺位保护的选秀权。）
虽然这些例子并不完全相似，因为它们涉及彻底无缘季后赛，但我认为它们说明了一个组织很难为了在选秀抽签中获得微小的概率优势而故意输掉季后赛。跌出第10名仅能让平均选秀顺位移动1.7位。
与此同时，输掉7-8名的比赛能让平均顺位提升6位，这并非无关紧要。但这也伴随着彻底无缘季后赛的高风险，以及进入季后赛后晋级概率降低的代价；再次强调，波特兰从第11顺位变成一无所有的例子极具启发性。
为什么选秀权保护不能设定在12到15顺位？
同样，这是为了防止投机取巧。一支拥有前12顺位保护选秀权（或13、14、15顺位）的球队理论上可以操纵战绩进入倒数前三，从而确保保住选秀权。相反，即使球队进入倒数前三，前11顺位保护的选秀权也只有75%的概率保住，但如果球队以“三个球”球队的身份完赛，保住概率为77%，这应该能消除任何摆烂动机。而前16顺位保护的选秀权只有在球队未能进入前七名时才能100%保住。
他们是否改变了已经交易出去的选秀权的价值？
是的，但可以认为这是一种更公平的方式，特别是对于那些通过获取烂队管理层的无保护选秀权来进行博弈的球队。那些获取选秀权的球队（如本赛季的亚特兰大）基本上被剥夺了让这些选秀权获得最佳抽签概率的机会，因为送出选秀权的球队（如本赛季的新奥尔良）没有摆烂动机并一直在竞争。
因此，像休斯顿这样手握菲尼克斯两个丰厚的未来无保护选秀权的球队，可能对这些变化并不太难过。他们依然有获得状元的潜力，并且相对容易获得两个乐透中段顺位，尽管可能不太像凯特尔人从篮网的愚蠢举动中收获塔图姆和布朗那样，获得一份意外之财。
事实上，在这些情况下，摆烂动机几乎发生了反转。管理层是否会决定“软摆烂”，以降低在选秀大年中交出高顺位选秀权这种尴尬情况发生的概率？
关于扩军？
虽然联盟的提案没有明确提到扩军，但有一个潜在假设，即扩军将产生两支新的“三个球”球队，并相应地改变其他所有球队的概率。
抽签池中拥有18支球队而不是16支将改变所有概率，并可能需要进行其他一些微调（例如上述的交易保护规则，或者垫底三支球队的保底顺位设为第12位），特别是在扩军球队可能被自动分配到乐透中段或后段位置的首个赛季。
如果垫底三队战绩持平怎么办？
虽然联盟的提案中没有明确说明，但如果两支球队并列战绩倒数第三，理论上有多种可能的解决方案。一种是通过掷硬币决定第三个抽签球的归属，从而平分概率；另一种是应用季后赛平分规则。
关于第二轮？
这部分尚未明确讨论，但第二轮选秀也很有可能发生变化。
目前，球队按战绩逆序选秀，这可能依然保留了轻微的摆烂动机（至少在理论环境下，如果不是所有的次轮签都已经被交易了五次的话），但不能保证这种情况会持续下去。例如，一种可能性是在第二轮反转抽签顺序。
如果抽中了不能赢得状元的球队，会发生什么？
最后，关于抽签细节的一个深奥问题是：如果一支球队因为前一年赢过而没有资格获得状元，但他们的球被抽中了，会发生什么？有两种可能性。
第一种是该球被放回；第二种是该球队自动被置于第二顺位。这两种方法对不具备资格球队产生的概率不同。
联盟发送给总经理们的示例使用了后者，这对不具备资格的球队要温和得多。例如，2025年的圣安东尼奥虽然没有资格获得前五顺位，但将有47%的概率获得第六顺位……而不是8%。
由生成式人工智能翻译，译文内容可能不准确或不完整，以原文为准。
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NBA Draft Lottery reform is wonderful and long overdue for the league
There’s a scene from an NBA team’s front-office meeting that I was once told about. It happened more than a decade ago, but the outlines will be familiar to many people in the business, and it is still relevant to a present-day discussion.
In this meeting, a team’s GM was sketching a particularly convoluted get-rich-quick transaction scheme that seemed both incredibly risky and unlikely to be particularly fruitful (both turned out to be true), when a lower-ranking staffer asked a simple question: “What if we just try to add good players and build the team?”
The staffer, of course, was laughed out of the room, but that question still gets short shrift when we talk about teams’ approaches to rebuilding.
For the most part, we’re in a different, smarter era, but the draft lottery remains the ultimate schemer’s scheme. Just debase yourself for half a decade or so with a full-on teardown that involves at least three years of going 18-64, and maybe the league will hand you Victor Wembanyama as a reward.
What’s funny is that, San Antonio Spurs aside, the tankers haven’t exactly taken over the league. That is one reason I’m extremely bullish on the league’s proposed lottery reform, which will vaporize any tanking incentives and revitalize what had become an atrocious on-court product for the final two months of the season.
The cost is that some front offices feel like a tool has been taken away: the ability to brazenly tank into position to select an elite talent. Some have argued that this would hit small markets particularly hard, as they are not free-agent (or, more realistically, “trade demand before free agency”) destinations.
So, before we talk about the NBA’s lottery reform, let’s talk about the 2025 NBA Finals. It featured two of the smallest, least glitzy markets in the league … and it was also a matchup that relied very little on tanking or high draft picks to reach its outcome.
- The best player on the court was Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, who was the 11th player taken in the 2018 draft and was traded both on draft night and again one year later.
- The second-best player on the court was Tyrese Haliburton, who was the 12th player taken in the 2020 draft and was traded less than two years later.
- The third-best player on the court was Jalen Williams, who was the 12th player taken in the 2022 draft after his own team picked Ousmane Dieng 11th and was selected with another team’s pick.
- The fourth-best player on the court was Pascal Siakam, the 27th player picked in the 2016 draft, who was also acquired in a trade.
While the Oklahoma City Thunder did indeed benefit from one eye-rolling tank year that netted them Chet Holmgren, the bulk of their roster was built with deft trades, smart late picks, “body snatching” free talent such as Lu Dort and Isaiah Joe and cap management that let them snag Isaiah Hartenstein in free agency. That’s how they went 68-14 in a season in which Holmgren only played 32 games.
So, yeah, I’m not that worried about the impact on small markets. And the rest of this is amazing. I love it.
I’ll talk about some of the minutiae further down, but I am sooooo excited to look at the schedule on a random night in March and not write off half the games as a charade with a predetermined outcome. It also has the added benefit of taking the league out of the fake-injury enforcement business. If you want to shut down Trae Young, that’s your business, but if you finish in the bottom three, you won’t get rewarded for it.
The formula the league came up with does a great job of eliminating overt, “The Process”-style tanking incentives while also managing “cliffs” where teams might be incentivized to stage-manage their positioning.
The biggest potential downside is that it removes the tanking option from front offices. I’m sorry, are we seriously calling that a negative? Let’s call it what it really is: a hallelujah.
News flash: Somebody will still get to pick first in a year with a generational talent; they aren’t canceling the draft. In the meantime, however, how about “make good moves and build your team” as a coping strategy?
Again, what strikes me most about the hand-wringing about the proposed lottery reform is the underlying presumption that tanking is the only means for a small-market team to contend with the big boys. Yes, the current system definitely incentivizes that approach, and it’s certainly the most expedient way to have a shot at generational talent.
But the presumption that elite talent requires a team to luck into a top-three pick on lottery night doesn’t exactly have overwhelming recent evidence in its favor. Six of the last seven MVP awards were won by players selected outside the top-10 picks; only Joel Embiid’s win in 2023 broke the streak, which is about to go to 7-of-8 if Gilgeous-Alexander repeats.
We can also take our 2025 finals exercise a lot further.
- The two best players for the 2024 champion Celtics were Jayson Tatum and Jaylen Brown, both of whom Boston acquired with draft picks from the Brooklyn Nets.
- The best player on the court in the 2023 finals was Nikola Jokić, who was the 41st pick in 2014. The second-best player was Jimmy Butler, the 30th pick in 2011. Miami’s top eight had no players who were selected in the top 10.
- The best player on the court in the 2022 finals was Steph Curry, who was the seventh pick in 2008. The next-best players after Tatum and Brown were Draymond Green, who was the 35th pick in 2012, and Klay Thompson, who was the 11th pick in 2011.
- The best player on the court in the 2021 finals was Giannis Antetokounmpo, who was the 15th pick in 2013. The small-market Bucks only got minutes from one player selected in the top 14 picks in the draft en route to winning the title; that player, Brook Lopez, was the 10th pick by Brooklyn 13 years prior.
- The second-best player in the series was Devin Booker, who was the 13th pick in 2015. Yes, there was one top overall pick in that series — Deandre Ayton, whom the Suns traded two years later.
- The best players in the 2020 finals were LeBron James and Anthony Davis … both of whom were the No. 1 pick in their respective drafts, but neither of whom was selected by the Lakers. Their opponent, Miami, had no players drafted in the top 10.
- The best player in the 2019 finals was Kawhi Leonard, who was the 15th pick by the Spurs in 2011. He was also the only player on Toronto’s entire team picked in the top 20; the Raptors’ fourth-leading scorer in the finals, Fred VanVleet, was an undrafted free agent.
You have to go all the way back to the 2015 through 2018 NBA Finals between Cleveland and Golden State to find a real impact for tanking, as the Cavs’ winning lotteries for Kyrie Irving, LeBron James (setting up his return) and Andrew Wiggins (setting up the trade for Kevin Love) undoubtedly were the primary factors in their success.
So, yes, landing a top pick can work as a catalyst for an organizational rebuild. Higher is definitely better, sometimes dramatically so.
Yes, landing a top pick is still very helpful for a rebuild. Just ask the Spurs and Victor Wembanyama. (Wendell Cruz / USA Today Sports)
What’s clear, however, is that it is far from the only way to build a good team, and it’s not totally clear that the pain is even worth the reward. To use one example: The Utah Jazz just set four years of an All-Star player’s prime on fire, and the best thing they have to show for it is a guy they took 16th.
So, at this point, I should probably talk about the actual lottery reform. I think the biggest thing to emphasize is that bad teams will still, by and large, have the best odds at getting the highest picks. They just won’t have to spend half the season manipulating the process.
How does this work?
In what the league has proposed as the “3-2-1” lottery, 16 teams will participate in the lottery and get either three balls, two balls or one ball in the lottery drawing.
- The bottom three teams in the standings will get two balls
- The other teams that don’t make the Play-In will get three balls
- The four teams in the 9-10 Play-In games will get two balls
- The losers of the 7-8 game in each conference will get one ball
Additionally:
- All 16 spots in the lottery (not just the top four) will be randomly drawn
- The bottom-three teams can’t pick lower than 12th
- Pick protections in trades can’t be top 12 through top 15
- Teams can’t pick No. 1 in consecutive years
- Teams can’t have top-five picks three straight years
What do the odds look like?
In years when the final two bullets above don’t apply, a “three-ball” team has an 8.1 percent chance at the top pick, a “two-ball” team is at 5.4 percent and a “one-ball” team is at 2.7 percent.
At the margins, it’s possible for the fourth-worst team to pick 16th (3 percent) or for the 7-8 Play-In loser to pick first (2.7 percent) or for the three worst teams to pick 10th, 11th and 12th (10.2 percent). Yeah, that’s a bad beat.
On average, however, it’s pretty fair across the spectrum: A bottom-three record only loses 0.7 spots in average draft position compared to the other “three-ball” teams and is still 1.0 spots better than the other “two-ball” teams. The “one-ball” teams, on average, pick 12th; maybe they get lucky and move up, but 60 percent of the time they pick 13th or later.
Lottery reform pick odds (%)
| First | Top 3 | Top 5 | Top 10 | Average | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Three worst teams | 5.4 | 16 | 28 | 61 | 8.1 |
| “Three-ball” teams | 8.1 | 24 | 39 | 73 | 7.4 |
| 9-10 seeds | 5.4 | 16 | 28 | 59 | 9.1 |
| 7-8 losers | 2.7 | 8 | 15 | 35 | 11.7 |
Those averages change slightly if other teams are ineligible. For example, if we were doing the lottery this year, the Dallas Mavericks would be ineligible to win it, which would raise the odds of each of the other lottery balls being No. 1 by about 0.2 percent. If it were 2025 under this system, San Antonio would have been ineligible to win the second pick (or any of the top five spots), and that would have raised the top-five odds of every other lottery ball by about 1 percent.
In terms of tanking, one might fret over a theoretical (and highly unlikely) example where five bad teams are also ineligible to land in the top five because they were the same ones from the previous two lotteries, thus creating a rush of enthusiasm for other teams to finish in the bottom 10. Otherwise, it’s hard to find many edges to gaming the system.
Why drag the bottom teams?
The motivation for knocking down the lottery odds for the worst three teams is to improve the product on the floor. Put simply, there is a huge difference between “trying to win” and “not overtly trying to lose,” and the league is trying to eliminate that by making, say, an April game between Utah and Memphis still matter and have ramifications. I think it’s pretty clear this will make for a better product than watching Bez Mbeng go for a triple-double against randomly selected civilians who were issued Grizzlies uniforms.
Additionally, the so-called “relegation games” at the bottom of the standings are likely to provide another layer of late-season entertainment, although they will matter less for teams that already traded unprotected picks. (Hi, Pelicans!)
The unfortunate side effect will be the badge of shame that comes with a bottom-three finish. Realistically, execs and coaches will need a lot of internal equity to survive such a season. I get why there is some trepidation about this part.
While this perhaps feels slightly unfair to the league’s bottom-three teams, let’s keep first things first there. The larger aim is that the league has to protect the product, and nudging the bottom teams’ lottery odds down feels like a fairly essential component in pulling that off.
Will teams tank out of seventh, or out of the Play-In?
Based on recent evidence, I highly doubt it. Losing the 7-8 game gives you a 2.7 percent chance at the top pick and an 11 percent chance at landing in the top four. Crashing out of the top 10 adds another 2.7 percent to the odds of the top pick and another 11 percent to the odds of a top four.
The argument is that a team could lose the 7-8 game but still have a good chance of making the playoffs by winning the next one at home; or, alternatively, that a club in Play-In contention could not bother trying to finish 10th to increase their odds by a similar amount. I think this is unlikely to happen in reality, because the league has made the “cliffs” here just small enough to reduce the temptation.
Most notably, two teams faced similar odds-improving propositions this year and never even considered punting.
Both Golden State and Portland entered the Play-In in a situation where crashing out would have landed them similar odds adjustments to those above. The Warriors landed a 2.0 percent chance at the top pick and a 9.4 percent chance at the top four when they eventually lost, but not before rallying from 13 down in the fourth to beat the LA Clippers in the 9-10 game. Golden State’s likely pick improved four spots, from 15th to 11th, when the Warriors lost.
Portland, meanwhile, would have inherited those same odds and lost its pick entirely if it won, and yet the Blazers still marched into Phoenix and smoked the Suns in the 7-8 game. (Portland owed a top-14 protected pick to the Bulls.)
While these examples aren’t entirely similar because they involved missing the playoffs entirely, I think they illustrate the difficulty of an organization losing a playoff game to gain a still-small probability advantage in the draft lottery; falling out of 10th moves the average draft pick only 1.7 spots.
Losing a 7-8 game, meanwhile, improves the average pick six spots, which is not inconsequential. But that also comes with a heightened risk of missing the playoffs entirely and a lower probability of advancing once there; again, Portland’s example of going from 11th to zilch is instructive.
Why can’t picks be protected 12 through 15?
Again, this is to shenanigan-proof things. A team with a top-12 protected pick (or 13, 14 or 15) could theoretically stage-manage its record to land in the bottom three and thus ensure it keeps the pick. Conversely, a top-11 protected pick is only 75 percent guaranteed even if the team lands in the bottom three, but 77 percent if the team finishes as a “three-ball” team, which should remove any tanking incentive. And a top-16 protected pick is 100 percent guaranteed only if a team fails to finish in the top seven.
Aren’t they changing the value of picks that were already traded?
Yes, but one can argue it’s happened in a much fairer way, especially for teams that essentially bet against bad front offices by acquiring their unprotected picks. Those acquiring teams (such as Atlanta this season) were basically blocked from having the best lottery odds for those picks because the teams that sent the pick (such as New Orleans this season) had no tanking incentive and kept on playing.
Thus, a team such as Houston — sitting on two plush unprotected future picks from Phoenix — probably isn’t too upset by these changes. They still have No. 1 upside and are relatively likely to land two mid-lottery picks, although perhaps a bit less likely to land a Tatum-and-Brown type windfall like the Celtics reaped from Brooklyn’s foolishness.
In fact, the tanking incentive almost flips in these cases. Would a front office decide to soft tank to reduce the odds that it gets the embarrassment of handing over a top pick in a loaded draft?
What about expansion?
While the league’s proposal didn’t specifically mention expansion, there is an underlying presumption that it would create two new “three-ball” teams and shift everyone else’s odds accordingly.
Having 18 teams rather than 16 in the lottery will shift all the odds and might necessitate some other small recalibrations (such as the trade-protection rule above, for instance, or the bottom three teams having a floor at No. 12), especially in the first season when the expansion teams are likely to be automatically slotted into positions in the middle or late lottery.
What about ties in the bottom three?
While not specifically addressed in the league’s proposal, the theoretical situation where two teams are tied for the third-worst record has multiple possible solutions. One is to effectively split their lottery odds by having a coin flip for the third lottery ball, while another is to apply postseason tiebreakers.
What about the second round?
This wasn’t specifically addressed yet, but there’s a decent chance the second round could change, too.
Right now, teams pick in reverse order of record, which might still preserve a mild tanking incentive (at least in a theoretical environment where every second-round pick under the sun hasn’t already been traded five times), but there’s no guarantee things continue that way. One possibility, for instance, would be to reverse the lottery order in the second round.
If a team that can’t win the lottery is picked first, what happens?
Finally, one last piece of arcane lottery minutiae is what happens when a team’s lottery ball is picked if they aren’t eligible to pick first because they won the previous year. There are two possibilities.
The first is that the ball is returned; the second is that the team is automatically placed into the second position, and those two methods return different odds for the ineligible team.
The example the league sent to its general managers uses the latter example, which is much gentler on the ineligible teams. For example, a team such as San Antonio in 2025 would have been ineligible for the top five but had a 47 percent chance of picking sixth … instead of 8 percent.
By John Hollinger, via The Athletic