By Jared Weiss and Joel Lorenzi | The Athletic, 2026-03-02 12:00:09
在过去的几周里，“摆烂”（Tanking）一直是 NBA 讨论的核心话题。随着犹他爵士队和印第安纳步行者队等球队因违反球员轮休政策而面临巨额罚款，联盟似乎已经对这种摆烂策略感到厌倦。
在这场争议的背景下，两支处于重建不同阶段的球队备受关注：圣安东尼奥马刺队和芝加哥公牛队。马刺队刚刚度过了一个完美的二月，直到周日才负于纽约尼克斯队；而公牛队则经历了队史最糟糕的一个月，二月份的 11 场比赛全部落败。
关于在摆烂盛行的环境下如何重建，以及在塑造一支成功的球队过程中能汲取哪些教训，这两支球队告诉了我们什么？公牛队跟队记者乔尔·洛伦齐 (Joel Lorenzi) 和马刺队跟队记者杰里德·韦斯 (Jared Weiss) 对此展开了讨论。
杰里德·韦斯 (Jared Weiss)： 我们在这里看到了两个截然相反的赛季故事。一方面是马刺队，他们是一个光辉的榜样，展示了向“摆烂之神”做出的牺牲如何能换来超出想象的财富。二月份 11 胜 0 负的战绩巩固了他们提前进入 NBA 竞争者行列的地位。另一方面是公牛队，这支球队终于承认，以 1.0 的坡度在平庸的跑步机上慢走并不能消耗多少热量。二月份 0 胜 11 负的战绩则落实了他们姗姗来迟地跌入 NBA 摆烂梯队的事实。
从这两支球队身上，我们能学到关于为什么要摆烂以及如何摆烂的哪些经验？
乔尔·洛伦齐 (Joel Lorenzi)： 我尽量不把这写成一篇对“摆烂”的颂歌——这种看似日渐式微的方法，曾是底层球队可能、或许、大概最终能享受优渥生活的途径。但谈论这两支球队的路径，别无他法。马刺队、雷霆队、活塞队——他们都曾沉溺于此。拥抱那些令人发指的低谷，派上由一堆“他在哪打球？”的边缘球员组成的阵容，承担风险并忍受随之而来的羞辱。这一切，都是为了换取一个通过选秀步入辉煌的机会。
幸运的圣安东尼奥马刺队获得了一个天外来客般的灭世级球员。底特律活塞队选中了一名 MVP 候选人。俄克拉荷马城雷霆队除了其他精明的运作外，还收获了全明星切特·霍姆格伦 (Chet Holmgren)。
而这支公牛队之所以陷入境地，是因为现任管理层任期内的基调就像电梯音乐一样平淡。等待是他们的强项。他们守着所有的资产，抱有一丝希望，认为拿到附加赛席位就能激发出一波有意义的攻势。他们惨淡的二月散发出一种绝望的气息——一支急于从一种行将就木的方法中攫取利益的球队，至少在某种程度上放弃了以往顽固的坚持。现在，拼凑出来的零件格格不入，缺乏天赋，且没有足够的时间建立默契——这简直是造就队史最差月份的完美风暴。
即便到了现在，这支临时的公牛队也无法忍受输球。但他们的阵容构成让他们别无选择。尽管这个二月的冲刺为“沉闷”一词带来了新的定义，但由于众多乐透区球队远在他们之下，这种努力可能也显得为时已晚。
杰里德·韦斯： 对公牛队来说，好消息是最近几次选秀抽签提醒了我们，概率仅仅是概率。你可以从任何位置抽中高位签，而这届选秀中有很多能改变特许经营权命运的奖品。但至少公牛队终于肯退后一步，以便最终能向前迈进。虽然人们往往关注最初转向摆烂以获得新基石的那一刻，但大多数球队都需要时间才能走到那一步。
你今天看到的马刺队，正是公牛队目前苦苦挣扎的类似旅程的产物。在 2018 年夏天将科怀·伦纳德 (Kawhi Leonard) 和丹尼·格林 (Danny Green) 交易到多伦多猛龙队换来德马尔·德罗赞 (DeMar DeRozan) 和雅各布·珀尔特尔 (Jakob Poeltl) 之后，他们曾试图继续争夺季后赛席位，而不是彻底摆烂。马刺队总经理莱特 (Wright) 终于在 2021 年拨动了重建杠杆，将德罗赞交易到了——在所有可能的地方中——芝加哥。
经过四年的乐透区摸爬滚打，他们得到了维克托·文班亚马 (Victor Wembanyama)、斯蒂芬·卡斯尔 (Stephon Castle)、迪伦·哈珀 (Dylan Harper) 以及现在已被裁掉的索汉 (Sochan)。坦率地说，在四次选秀中选中三个核心，在当今已经是相当不错的成功率了。当然，赢得过去 20 年最重要的选秀抽签并带走文班，对他们大有裨益。
马刺队的表现远超赛季前的预期，但这不仅仅是因为文班的崛起。事实上，这反而是克服了崛起过程中的阵痛，因为球队建立了一种文化和体系，使其在成长的烦恼中保持了稳定性。在重建岁月中培养出的老将，如凯尔登·约翰逊 (Keldon Johnson)、德文·瓦塞尔 (Devin Vassell) 和朱利安·尚帕尼 (Julian Champagnie)，为球队在原始天赋周围提供了深度。他们在去年交易截止日追求德阿隆·福克斯 (De’Aaron Fox)，现在看来这笔交易物超所值，在入选全明星后，他正为进攻端提供稳定的掌控，这在季后赛中应当会显得更有价值。
乔尔·洛伦齐： 所有从摆烂时代走出来的球队都有这些共同点：运气、培养以及建立一套真正的体系和文化。这对公牛队来说是一份令人望而生畏的清单。
第一个关键是接受。了解你所处的险恶境地，特别是对于雷霆和马刺这样的小市场球队，要寻找最可行的救生艇。
雷霆队硬生生抗过了两个糟糕的赛季，并且对此感到泰然自若，除了显而易见的乐透签含义外，还因为：a) 核心球员获得了锻炼机会；b) 输球从未阻止他们建立赢球习惯和体系化的打法，即便在核心球员缺阵时，你依然能看到这种风格。这也有赖于他们提拔了一位谦逊、年轻、像个“疯狂科学家”一样的主教练，他能与核心阵容共同成长，且从不背离组织价值观。
马刺队得到了乐透之神的眷顾。但他们也做出了尝试——比如索汉的控卫实验——并且变得大胆。在那些被遗忘的比赛月份里，他们找到了身边的核心层。
与所有涉及选秀抽签的事情一样，圣安东尼奥获得维克托·文班亚马也需要一点运气。(John E. Sokolowski / USA Today Network via Imagn Images)
底特律活塞队，即使在两个赛季前经历了破纪录的 28 连败，也凭借态度和身份认同从灰烬中重生。活塞队打球很卖力，且坚定不移，带有昔年底特律球队的影子。事实证明，凯德·坎宁安 (Cade Cunningham) 的意志并未崩溃。事实证明，杰伦·杜伦 (Jalen Duren) 是完美的挡拆搭档。性格，虽然选秀时需要运气，但可以超越输球的陷阱。
事实证明，输球并不一定就是地狱。
重建的风险是可怕的。但身处中游，尤其是公牛队近年来展现出的那种状态，才是真正的噩梦。
杰里德·韦斯： 联盟排名前三的球队（底特律、俄克拉荷马城和圣安东尼奥）的共同点是，他们都在高顺位选秀中多次命中（雷霆还交易到了二年级的谢伊·吉尔杰斯-亚历山大 (Shai Gilgeous-Alexander)）。他们采取了不同的阵容组建路线，但三支球队都建立了防守文化，这让他们在进攻天赋开发的同时能够迅速具备竞争力。
马刺队自十月以来的口号就是防守是不可谈判的。他们知道自己拥有文班这样的特殊天才，而对队内每个人的挑战是，要在防守端做到足够好，这样他们的进攻才会变得容易。随着赛季的进行，球队的防守变得如此协调，以至于文班在比赛中只需巡视禁区。这让他在进攻端的生活更加轻松，现在马刺队在进攻和防守两端都排名联盟前五。圣安东尼奥得到了文班，理解他的核心竞争力是什么，然后围绕它建立了一种契合的文化。
公牛队还没有找到他们的核心。但在你看来，他们在未来基石成长起来之前，建立文化的途径是什么？
乔尔·洛伦齐： 我看到了几条路径：达林·彼得森 (Darryn Peterson)、AJ·迪班萨 (AJ Dybantsa)、卡梅隆·布泽尔 (Cameron Boozer)、卡莱布·威尔逊 (Caleb Wilson)。
严肃地说，文化建设没有固定模板。尽管存在相互交织的影响，但雷霆的文化不是马刺的文化，而圣安东尼奥的也不是底特律的。
如果阵容无法执行，或者没有一名定下基调的球员来带头，那么体系和场上文化就只是白日梦。我原以为阿图拉斯·卡尼绍瓦斯 (Artūras Karnišovas) 在进入休赛期时有正确的想法，公开致力于建立防守身份。然后，艾萨克·奥科罗 (Isaac Okoro)——一名极其重要的外线防守者——成了该团体的唯一补充。
攻守兼备的护框者是很难找到的类型。而且他们也不便宜。底特律、圣安东尼奥和俄克拉荷马城都拥有伟大的护框者和强大的双塔阵容。芝加哥两者皆无。奥科罗是他们唯一受人推崇的外线防守者，而公牛队交给了他艰巨的任务。马塔斯·布泽利斯 (Matas Buzelis) 被寄予厚望成为一名多位置防守者，但目前还未能固定在一个位置上。
甚至公牛队的进攻身份也感觉不够成熟，它是在向约什·吉迪 (Josh Giddey) 和目前球员的能力妥协，而不是建立一种无论谁在场都能屹立不倒的身份（参考雷霆在任何伤病情况下的表现）。值得称赞的是，比利·多诺万 (Billy Donovan) 琢磨出了一些可能最大限度发挥吉迪作用的东西。它专注于转换，依赖于保持球移动的快速回合，并力求不让进攻节奏慢到爬行。但伟大的球队拥有阵容多样性，能够承受半场进攻的混乱。
布泽利斯在公牛队推倒重建之前确实缺乏作为持球者的创作自由。但他的控球也并不稳健，经常要么运球撞入死胡同，要么被迫收球。与此同时，吉迪的挡拆频率排在联盟第 94 百分位，但每回合挡拆得分仅为 0.78 分。
公牛队很可能过快地放弃了培养他们的进攻身份。他们还没有一个半场进攻引擎来帮助维持他们的表现，或在事情进展不顺时帮助他们生存。
公牛队单纯需要天赋。如果他们想在等待那个未来的引擎时先建立防守，他们可以从引进防守者开始。考虑到吉迪给阵容带来的局限性，这对任何涉及吉迪的计划来说都是尤为必要的。
杰里德·韦斯： 这就是阵容构建中最棘手的部分：弄清楚当基石球员有重大缺陷时，你能走多远。
每当一支球队在场上派出不具备投射能力的阵容时，文班就会守在禁区，马刺通常就能获胜。在马刺周日以 89-114 输给尼克斯的比赛中，纽约队展示了一个破解之策：当文班完全放空乔什·哈特 (Josh Hart) 时，文班会在哈特得到大空位球时稍微离开禁区，尼克斯的中锋就会冲向篮板位置，并经常赢得争抢，获得二次进攻机会。
这恰恰说明球队在场上有糟糕射手的情况下依然能赢球，但这需要极强的强韧度和协作。这也说明了为什么在过去几年不设中锋的小球阵容盛行之后，各队又重新开始重视七尺长人。
马刺队目前担心的是这类迫在眉睫的问题，而公牛队距离担心决定成败的战术细节还很遥远。至少公牛队终于开始为未来而建设了。虽然外面可能没有像文班那样的头奖，但马刺队建立的均衡模型和防守文化，应该成为公牛队效仿的路径。
由生成式人工智能翻译，译文内容可能不准确或不完整，以原文为准。
点击查看原文：Spurs, Bulls have shown that the NBA life cycle is full of risk and reward
Spurs, Bulls have shown that the NBA life cycle is full of risk and reward
Tanking has been at the forefront of NBA conversation for the past few weeks. With teams like the Utah Jazz and Indiana Pacers facing significant fines for violating player-participation policies, the league seems fed up with the methodology of tanking.
In the background of this controversy have been two teams at different points of their respective rebuilds: the San Antonio Spurs and the Chicago Bulls. The Spurs just had a perfect February before losing Sunday to the New York Knicks, while the Bulls had the worst month in their history, losing all 11 games they played in February.
What do these two teams tell us about rebuilding in the tanking environment and the lessons learned in shaping a successful franchise? Bulls writer Joel Lorenzi and Spurs writer Jared Weiss discuss.
Jared Weiss: Here we have a tale of two seasons that have gone in opposite directions. On one hand is the Spurs, a shining example of how a sacrifice to the tanking gods can be rewarded with riches beyond your wildest dreams. An 11-0 February solidified their early arrival in the NBA’s contention tier. On the other hand, we have the Bulls, the franchise that finally admitted that walking the treadmill of mediocrity at 1.0 incline wasn’t burning many calories. An 0-11 February solidified their way-too-late arrival to the NBA’s tanking tier.
What can we learn from these two franchises about why and how to tank?
Joel Lorenzi: I’ll try not to make this an ode to tanking, the NBA’s (apparently) dying method for bottom feeders to possibly, maybe, perhaps, eventually enjoy the finer things. But there’s no other way to talk about these teams’ paths. The Spurs, the Thunder, the Pistons — they all indulged. Embraced ungodly lows, deployed lineups composed of “Who he play for?” favorites, took risks and absorbed the subsequent shame. All for a chance to draft into glory.
San Antonio, with luck, was awarded an extraterrestrial world-breaker. Detroit selected an MVP candidate. Oklahoma City, alongside other shrewd moves, netted All-Star Chet Holmgren.
These Bulls are here because the soundtrack for this regime’s tenure is elevator music. Waiting is their strong suit. They held all their assets, and they held out hope that a Play-In Tournament berth could spark a meaningful run. Their dreadful February reeks of a team that grew desperate to reap the benefits of a dying method, at least somewhat relinquishing its old, stubborn ways. Now the makeshift parts are ill-fitting, devoid of talent and have too little time for a rapport — a perfect storm for the worst month in franchise history.
Even now, these temporary Bulls can’t stomach losing. Their composition leaves them little choice. And despite bringing a new definition to dreary, this February push might also prove too late with so many lottery teams well beneath them.
Weiss: The good news for the Bulls is that the last few lotteries have reminded us that probabilities are only probabilities. You can win a high pick from anywhere, and this draft has a plethora of franchise-altering prizes. But at least the Bulls are finally taking a step back so they can ultimately take a step forward. While people tend to focus on that initial turn toward the tank as the moment to get the new franchise cornerstone, most teams need time to get there.
The Spurs you see today are a byproduct of a similar journey the Bulls are struggling through. After they traded Kawhi Leonard and Danny Green to the Toronto Raptors for DeMar DeRozan and Jakob Poeltl in the summer of 2018, they tried to keep fighting for the playoffs instead of going all the way into the tank. Spurs general manager Brian Wright finally pulled the rebuild lever in 2021, trading DeRozan to, of all places, Chicago.
Four years of working the lottery later, they’ve come away with Victor Wembanyama, Stephon Castle, Dylan Harper and the now-waived Jeremy Sochan. Frankly, hitting on three of four picks is a pretty good success rate these days. It helps that they won the most important lottery of the last 20 years to get Wemby.
The Spurs are well ahead of preseason expectations, but it’s not just because of Wembanyama’s ascension. It’s actually despite it, as the team has built a culture and system that has enabled consistency through his growing pains. Veterans developed through the rebuilding years, and Keldon Johnson, Devin Vassell and Julian Champagnie have provided the depth the team needs around its raw talent. They went after De’Aaron Fox at last year’s trade deadline for what is looking like pretty good value after his All-Star berth, and he is providing a steady hand to the offense that should prove to be even more valuable in the postseason.
Lorenzi: All the teams that emerged from the tank era have these things in common: luck, development and the implementation of a real system and culture. A daunting checklist for the Bulls.
The first key is acceptance. Knowing the steep waters you’re in and, especially in the case of the small-market Thunder and Spurs, fishing for the most viable life raft.
The Thunder took two horrid seasons on the chin and were comfortable with doing so, besides the obvious lottery implications, because a) core players earned reps, and b) the losing never kept them from installing winning habits and a systemic playstyle that you still see when their top guys are sidelined. It helps that they promoted a modest, young mad scientist of a coach who would grow with the core and never lose sight of the organizational values.
The Spurs were kissed on the cheek by the lottery gods. But they tried things — see Sochan’s point guard experiment — and got bold. Amid the forgettable months of hoop, they found their surrounding core.
As with all things lottery, San Antonio landing Victor Wembanyama took a little luck. (John E. Sokolowski / USA Today Network via Imagn Images)
Detroit, even after losing a record 28 consecutive games two seasons ago, rose from the ashes with attitude and identity. The Pistons play hard and are unwavering, with shades of Detroit teams before them. Cade Cunningham’s will, it turns out, wasn’t broken. Jalen Duren, it turns out, was the perfect pick-and-roll partner. Character, which requires some luck to draft, can transcend the pitfalls of losing.
Losing, it turns out, doesn’t need to be hell.
The risk of a rebuild is terrifying. But the middle, particularly the way the Bulls have made it look in recent years, is the true nightmare.
Weiss: The commonality between the top three teams in the league (Detroit, Oklahoma City and San Antonio) is that they all had multiple hits high in the draft (and traded for a second-year Shai Gilgeous-Alexander in OKC’s case). They took different routes to building the rosters, but all three built a defensive culture that allowed them to compete quickly while their offensive talent developed.
The Spurs’ messaging since October has been that defense is a non-negotiable. They knew they had something special in Wembanyama, and the challenge to everyone on the team was to get good enough defensively that their offense would come easily. As the season has gone on, the team’s defense has become so coordinated that Wembanyama spends games just patrolling the paint. It’s made his life easier on offense, and now the Spurs are a top-five team on both ends. San Antonio got its guy in Wemby, understood what his core competency is and then built a culture that fits around it.
The Bulls don’t have their guy yet. But what do you see as their pathway to building a culture that will be ready when their future cornerstone develops?
Lorenzi: I see a few paths: Darryn Peterson, AJ Dybantsa, Cameron Boozer, Caleb Wilson.
In all seriousness, there’s no template for culture building. Despite the overlapping influences, the Thunder’s culture is not the Spurs’ culture, and San Antonio’s isn’t Detroit’s.
A system and on-court culture that can’t be executed by the roster (or spearheaded by a tone-setting player) is merely a pipedream. I thought Artūras Karnišovas had the right idea entering the offseason, publicly dedicated to building a defensive identity. Then Isaac Okoro, an irrationally important point-of-attack defender, became the only addition to the group.
Two-way rim protectors are a difficult archetype to find. They aren’t cheap, either. Detroit, San Antonio and OKC each boast great rim protectors and formidable double-big lineups. Chicago has neither. Okoro is its only revered perimeter defender, and the Bulls have handed him strenuous assignments. Matas Buzelis, a hopeful multipositional defender, hasn’t been able to settle into a position.
Even the Bulls’ offensive identity feels half-baked, bending to Josh Giddey and the current roster’s abilities as opposed to building an identity that can stand regardless of who’s in the lineup (see the Thunder any time they experience injuries). To Billy Donovan’s credit, he cooked something that could potentially maximize Giddey. It’s transition-focused, reliant on quick possessions that keep the ball moving, and aims to not allow possessions to slow down to a crawl. But great teams possess lineup versatility and can withstand half-court turmoil.
Buzelis certainly lacked creative freedom as a ballhandler before the Bulls hit reset. But his handle is also flimsy, and he often either dribbles into broken actions or is forced to pick the ball up. Meanwhile, Giddey is in the 94th percentile in pick-and-roll frequency while converting 0.78 points per possession on those plays.
It’s entirely possible that the Bulls pivoted from cultivating their offensive identity too soon. They don’t yet have a half-court engine that helps sustain their play or helps them survive when things don’t go their way.
The Bulls simply need talent. And if they want to build defense first while they await that prospective engine, they can start by acquiring defenders. That’s especially necessary for any plans involving Giddey, considering the limitations he brings to lineups.
Weiss: That’s the tricky part of roster building, figuring out how far you can go when a cornerstone has a major vulnerability.
Any time a team puts out a lineup with a non-shooter on the floor, Wembanyama camps in the paint, and the Spurs typically win. In the Spurs’ 114-89 loss to the Knicks on Sunday, New York showed a wrinkle that can counter that when Wembanyama was sagging all the way off Josh Hart. Wembanyama would leave the paint just a little bit when Hart would get the ball wide open, and the Knicks’ center would crash into rebounding position and often win that battle for a second-chance bucket.
It just goes to show that teams can still win with a bad shooter on the floor, but it requires a lot of toughness and coordination. It also shows why teams have come back around to valuing 7-footers after micro-ball lineups without a center were taking off the past few years.
The Spurs are worrying about problems like this in the immediate, while the Bulls are far off from worrying about game-plan intricacies determining their success. At least the Bulls are finally starting to build toward their future. There may not be a prize quite like Wembanyama out there, but the balanced model and defensive culture the Spurs have developed should serve as a pathway for the Bulls to emulate.
By Jared Weiss and Joel Lorenzi, via The Athletic