By Eric Koreen, Mike Vorkunov, Tony Jones | The Athletic, 2025-12-29 11:00:41
全明星周末还未到来，NBA 已经开始直面摆烂问题。
据报道，联盟正在考虑修改规则，以抑制球队的摆烂行为，这部分是对此前赛季一大头条新闻——博彩丑闻的回应。当然，摆烂现象在联盟与合法体育博彩合作之前就已存在，除了博彩因素，NBA 也有诸多理由希望消除球队放弃比赛或赛季的动机。
然而，联盟在最近一次董事会会议上提出几个选项，这已是迈出了一大步。The Athletic 的托尼·琼斯 (Tony Jones)、埃里克·科伦 (Eric Koreen) 和迈克·沃库诺夫 (Mike Vorkunov) 共同探讨了该问题的本质、相关提案以及联盟为遏制或减少输球动机可能采取的其他措施。
摆烂到底是个多大的问题？
琼斯： 我认为这是一个中等程度的问题。我不认为这是联盟面临的最大问题，但我同意联盟或许需要进行某种形式的改革。当前的制度不鼓励那些自认无法真正竞争的球队去争胜。但我认为，这个问题中最核心的症结在于小市场球队缺乏其他出路。
如果犹他爵士队有 5000 万美元的薪金空间，但由于市场性质，无法利用这些空间吸引人才，那么他们提升实力的唯一途径就是通过选秀。而对他们来说，这就意味着摆烂。有多个市场面临同样的问题，这给整个联盟都带来了影响。
科伦： 在我个人看来，这个问题的严重性仅次于球员出勤率，而后者本身就是摆烂的一个重要组成部分。无论从理念上还是实践上，我都反对激励输球这种行为。从理念上说：这是职业体育，争胜应该是至高无上的。任何因不争胜而获得的好处都应被根除。球迷们不应该去琢磨，自己主队的输赢到底哪样更好。
如果球队不是经常试图利用这一点，它就不会成为问题。但我们已经看到，有球队为了长远利益而放弃整个赛季（如奇才、爵士），放弃部分赛季（如76人、篮网），或是在赛季末段选择性地放弃比赛（如独行侠）。这导致整个月（指三月）的比赛都缺乏竞争力，更凸显了此问题的严重性。
沃库诺夫： 我认为这个问题没有我们想的那么严重，但比它应该的程度要严重。过去一些著名的“摆烂大师”行事相当明目张胆，我想这让我们所有人都变成了怀疑论者。
摆烂带来了两大问题。一个是场上呈现的比赛内容，另一个是信任危机。当球队不努力争胜时，这项运动在那些城市的价值就被贬低了，对他们交手的其他球队也是如此。胜利本应是至高无上的，因此为球队和球迷创造一种反向激励机制是有问题的。如果你看比赛是希望自己的球队输球，那为什么还要看比赛呢？
对我而言，信任危机源于球员因伤病或其他原因被安排休战，而我们很难相信这些理由是真实的。这可能导致对整个联盟产品的信任度下降。
你见过最过分的摆烂例子是什么？
琼斯： 上赛季爵士队在很长一段时间里雪藏劳里·马尔卡宁 (Lauri Markkanen) 和沃克·凯斯勒 (Walker Kessler) 的事显然是大家热议的焦点。但犹他远非唯一这样做的球队。俄克拉荷马城雷霆队在多个赛季中长时间让谢伊·吉尔杰斯-亚历山大 (Shai Gilgeous-Alexander) 休战，行为极其过分——而且显然奏效了。
金州勇士队那次为得到哈里森·巴恩斯 (Harrison Barnes) 的摆烂也显而易见。我曾见过洛杉矶快船队在 2022 年为了进入当时西部第一爵士队所在的半区，而故意输球放弃了更高的季后赛排位。所以，这甚至是一个公开摆烂不仅限于争夺选秀顺位的例子。
科伦： 我选择不回答我自创的这个问题，而是描述一个我最喜欢的摆烂例子。人们常说，摆烂的是管理层，而不是教练和球员。2005-06 赛季的明尼苏达森林狼队需要让他们的选秀权落在前十才能保留它。在最后一场比赛中，计划的一部分是让辗转多队的球员马克·马德森 (Mark Madsen) 上场 30 分钟，投出 15 中 1 的命中率，其中三分球 7 投 0 中。那场比赛的三分出手数占了他整个职业生涯三分出手总数的 43.8%。在他其他九个赛季的 452 场比赛中，他总共只出手了 9 次三分。
不知何故，那场比赛还是被拖入了加时赛，最终明尼苏达“如愿”输掉了比赛。森林狼保住了他们的选秀权，最终得到了兰迪·弗耶 (Randy Foye)。他们在选秀夜的交易中送走了布兰登·罗伊 (Brandon Roy)。
沃库诺夫： 我不知道哪个例子最过分，但每个球队在赛季末摆烂的例子都像一片美丽的雪花，各不相同。但问题是，当雪花积攒得太多，你就会陷入一场暴风雪之中。
你如何看待据报道 NBA 正在讨论的这些想法——提前锁定乐透抽签概率的日期、规定球队不能连续多年抽中乐透前列顺位，以及限制交易选秀权的保护方式？
琼斯： 我最赞同的提议是禁止球队连续多次在乐透抽签中抽中高顺位。我不认为其他提议是可行的，或者说应该成为正式规则。但禁止连续赢得乐透大奖这一条，我认为对联盟的整体健康发展最为公平。
我不认为圣安东尼奥马刺队应该在一个赛季有机会选中维克托·文班亚马 (Victor Wembanyama) 之后，下个赛季还有机会选中斯蒂芬·卡斯尔 (Stephon Castle)，再下个赛季还有机会选中迪伦·哈珀 (Dylan Harper)。在前两个例子中，他们的顺位都比初始概率预测的要高。如果一支球队向上跃升一次，那很好。但马刺队在过去四年中三度享有的那种好运，让这一切看起来像是刻意为之，尽管我们都知道事实并非如此。
科伦： 总体而言，这些都是治标不治本的半吊子措施。这听起来像是在批评，事实也的确如此，但我承认这是不可避免的。NBA 正试图平衡多方利益，并且显然担心会矫枉过正。我确信联盟不希望扼杀弱队（小市场球队）的希望，也担心任何极端的摆烂解决方案会造成这种后果。
我相信，限制一支球队进入乐透前三或前五的频率是积极的一步。我甚至会更进一步，但我认为这可以作为现有方案改良的一部分。
我对其他潜在的修复方案则不太看好。更改锁定抽签概率的日期只会改变球队决定摆烂的时间，而不会改变他们是否会摆烂。虽然限制选秀权保护的性质会减少导致球队决定摆弓的转折点，但只要输球越多获得高顺位签的概率就越大，就总会有球队愿意放弃部分赛季。此外，这对于遏制战绩最差的球队进行长达数个赛季的重建也收效甚微。
沃库诺夫： 我认为 NBA 在这里要解决的是一个非常特殊的问题，而不是彻底解决摆烂问题。联盟试图解决摆烂，是为了防止它被体育博彩玩家利用来牟利。在我看来，这和最终根除摆烂是两码事。（不过，如果我悲观一点看，也许现在 NBA 可以利用这股势头，推动那些在其他情况下可能无法通过的彻底变革。）
这个特殊的问题在于，要消除那种“比公众提前几分钟或几小时获得球员休战信息，并利用该信息对相关球队下注”的情况。这与一支球队在全明星周末后开启“简单模式”是不同的。一个是宏观选择，另一个则是一系列重复的微观选择。（是的，我知道两者有重叠。）它们可能需要不同的解决方案。
你心中理想的摆烂解决方案是什么？
琼斯： 让战绩最差的球队有最大机会获得最高顺位的选秀权。但这些球队不能连续几个赛季获得高顺位签——我们称之为前四顺位吧。如果一支球队知道尝到甜头的机会更少，理论上他们就会更重视赢下比赛。
爵士队正面临着我所见过的最大困境之一。他们显然是一支有能力在西部联盟打进附加赛的球队，甚至可能竞争高达第 8 的席位。但他们欠俄克拉荷马城雷霆队一个首轮签，这个签位是前八顺位保护的，而这又是一个历史级的选秀大年。那么，他们该怎么做？是继续发挥出他们应有的水平？还是松开油门？
NBA 会密切关注他们的行为。
科伦： 任何时候，输球都不应该有任何激励。
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所有未能进入季后赛第二轮的球队都拥有均等的乐透抽签机会。然而，战绩与选秀顺序之间没有任何关联。所有 22 个签位都通过抽签决定，而不是像现在的乐透抽签只决定前四顺位。
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此外，任何在前五顺位选秀的球队，在接下来的一个赛季中将没有资格再次获得前五顺位。任何赢得状元签的球队，在接下来的两个赛季中没有资格获得前五顺位，且五年内不能再获得状元签。
这个方案的核心在于，在我看来，没有球队会为了 22 分之一的概率赢得乐透而放弃进入季后赛第二轮的机会。然而，我能预见到一支有附加赛潜力的球队，可能会为了 14 分之一的乐透概率，而放弃进入季后赛并在首轮大概率输给强得多的对手。
沃库诺夫： 我认为我的一些想法在这里仍然适用。取消选秀制度无疑会很有趣，可能会创造出一种新型的交易周期，NBA可以利用和推广它，或许能带来一种全新的、充满活力的自由球员市场，因为目前的版本有点索然无味。可以想象一下 NBA 版本的大学“全国签约日”。联盟可以构建许多不同方式的“选秀自由市场”，既能让战绩最差的球队保有优势（这正是选秀的全部意义所在），又不会重现当前的激励结构。
但是，正如我之前所说，NBA 需要解决的是针对体育博彩的特定版本问题。我很乐意看到选秀制度被取消，但对于这个问题来说，这可能是一个过于庞大的解决方案。我认为限制选秀权保护是解决摆烂问题的一个简单方法。只允许选秀权进行前四和前十四顺位保护（或许还有状元签保护），这在某种程度上让事情超出了球队的控制范围，使得选择变得更加二元化——即你是否进入季后赛。现在的乐透抽签概率更加扁平化，所以战绩第四差和第八差之间几乎没有区别。
我还有一个天马行空的方法，那就是 NBA 和球队打破常规，开诚布公地解释他们轮休球员的原因。如果一支球队能够提前很长时间承认他们将让最好的球员休战，那么利用内幕信息对这些比赛下注就会变得更加困难。比如说，如果步行者队决定为了优化他们的乐透抽签运气而让帕斯卡尔·西亚卡姆 (Pascal Siakam) 休战，他们应该能够在 3 月 4 日就宣布西亚卡姆将缺席本赛季剩余的所有比赛，而不是每天晚上都就他是否上场进行来来回回地拉扯。或者，也许国王队决定在某场比赛中让大部分首发球员休息，那就允许他们提前一周宣布。如果目标是缩短或消除博彩玩家试图利用的时间窗口，那么尽可能地提前和透明化是有益的。
给自己的提案唱唱反调：它会遇到什么阻力？
琼斯： 对我的提议的反驳意见会是：那像犹他爵士队这样的球队该怎么办？或者俄克拉荷马城雷霆队？这些球队无法像洛杉矶湖人队或纽约尼克斯队那样，通过自由球员市场来提升实力。他们唯一的出路就是囤积大量选秀权，在乐透区高顺位找到一位天才球员，然后围绕这位前三顺位的球员进行出色的选秀。
爵士队在前三顺位之外的选秀做得很好——控球后卫基昂特·乔治 (Keyonte George) 已经成长为全明星候选人。但他们在当前的重建中还没有得到一个前三顺位的选秀权。
雷霆队则两者兼备。他们在乐透区末段用杰伦·威廉姆斯 (Jalen Williams) 淘到了金子。他们也在前三顺位用切特·霍姆格伦 (Chet Holmgren) 淘到了金子。
科伦： 这会让差队变得更难翻身。任何将输球与选秀顺位脱钩的计划都容易受到这种批评。我认为这是有意为之的特点，而非一个缺陷，但我理解这可能会给那些在联盟底层苦苦挣扎的球队的球迷带来一种“永远无法好转”的感觉。然而，如果这样的体系意味着球队将不太可能为了（选秀权）乐透彩票而交易掉他们最好的球员，我相信未来像现在这样远离成功的球队会更少。
此外，这个想法可能会减少交易，而交易通常是 NBA 新闻周期的主导内容。同上：如果这能导致更多球员在同一支球队效力更长时间，那太好了。也许会有更多基于阵容适配度的球员换球员交易，而不是权衡现在与未来。即使球队交易未来选秀权会承担风险，但 a) 他们仍然可以对其进行保护；b) 那些争夺总冠军的球队仍然会进行“毕其功于一役”的交易。
沃库诺夫： 嗯，你不能取消选秀，因为它已经存在了几十年，而且（选秀大会）本身就是一档电视节目。（不过所有电视节目最终都会被取消，谢天谢地，《芝麻街》除外。）允许球员提前“关机”可能会给联盟带来不好的形象。如果你认为负荷管理（至少还有运动科学的成分）都招致了批评，那么等到球迷们开始指责联盟公开让优秀球员休战，只为让球队变得更差时，你再看看会发生什么。一些球队不会喜欢受限制的选秀权保护——我已经和一些管理层高管聊过，他们不喜欢——因为处理复杂问题正是他们的工作职责所在，但这些正是 NBA 拿了钱就必须做出的艰难抉择。这也会是一个长期问题，因为首个没有任何受限制选秀权的年份是 2033 年选秀。
除此之外，我的这些想法显然都是天才之举，我看不出有任何弊端。
由生成式 AI 翻译，译文内容可能不准确或不完整，以原文为准。
点击查看原文：Can NBA’s new proposals fix tanking? Is it even worth it for the league to try?
Can NBA’s new proposals fix tanking? Is it even worth it for the league to try?
It’s not even the All-Star break, and the NBA is already opening itself up to the tanking question.
According to reports, the league is considering rule changes to discourage teams from accepting losing, partly a response to the gambling scandal that has been one of the top stories of this season. Of course, tanking predates the league’s tie-in with legal sports gambling, and there are many reasons beyond wagering for the NBA to want to disincentivize teams from punting on games or seasons.
However, the league presenting a few options at a recent board of governors meeting is a big step. The Athletic’s Tony Jones, Eric Koreen and Mike Vorkunov discussed the nature of the problem, the proposals and other steps the league could take to stop or minimize the incentive to lose.
How big of a problem is tanking?
Jones: I think it’s a moderate issue. I don’t think it’s the biggest issue the league faces, but I don’t disagree that the league could probably use some reform of sorts. The setup now discourages teams from trying to win if they don’t truly think they can compete. But I think the biggest issue inside the issue is the lack of any other recourse for small-market teams.
If the Utah Jazz have $50 million in cap space, but, because of the nature of the market, can’t use that space in order to attract talent, then their only road to improvement is through the draft. And for them, that means tanking. There are multiple markets that face that same issue, and that has an affect across the league.
Koreen: It’s second on my personal list behind player availability, which is a big part of tanking. I am both philosophically and practically opposed to incentivizing losing. With the former: This is professional sports, and trying to win should be paramount. Any benefit for not doing that should be eradicated. Fans should not have to wonder whether it’s better for their favorite teams to win or lose.
If teams weren’t trying to exploit this regularly, it wouldn’t be an issue. But we’ve seen teams throw away seasons at a time (the Wizards, Jazz), portions of a season (76ers, Nets) or just select games at the end of the season (Mavericks) in the name of long-term interests. That it makes a whole month of the season uncompetitive only underscores the importance of the issue.
Vorkunov: I think it’s less of an issue than we think, but more than it should be. Some of the great tank commanders of years past have been pretty flagrant, and I think that has created cynics out of all of us.
Tanking has created these two big problems. There’s one problem, which is the on-court product, and another, which is the trust problem. When teams are trying not to win, it devalues the sport in those cities and also for the other teams they play. Winning should be paramount, so creating an inverse incentive structure for organizations and fans is troublesome. If you’re watching games hoping your team will lose, then why watch the games at all?
The trust problem, to me, comes from how players get held out with injuries or whatever reason, and it’s hard to trust that those reasons are true. That can lead to a lack of trust in the rest of the product.
What is the most egregious example of tanking you’ve seen?
Jones: The Jazz shelving Lauri Markkanen and Walker Kessler for large chunks of last season is obviously what’s being talked about. But Utah is hardly the only team that has done this. Oklahoma City sitting Shai Gilgeous-Alexander for large chunks of multiple seasons was egregious — and it obviously worked.
Golden State’s tank job that landed them Harrison Barnes was apparent. I once saw the Los Angeles Clippers tank a playoff spot in 2022 so they could get into Utah’s side of the bracket, when the Jazz were the No. 1 seed in the Western Conference, so that’s even an example of open tanking not being limited to draft position.
Koreen: I’ll choose to not answer the question I made up and instead describe my favorite example of tanking. It’s often said that front offices tank, while coaches and players don’t. The 2005-06 Minnesota Timberwolves needed to have their draft pick land in the top 10 to retain it. In the final game, that plan involved journeyman forward Mark Madsen playing 30 minutes to go 1 of 15 from the field and 0 of 7 from 3. That game accounted for 43.8 percent of his career 3-point attempts. He took nine 3s in his other 452 games across nine seasons.
Somehow, that game still went to overtime, with Minnesota eventually pulling out the loss. The Wolves kept their pick, eventually winding up with Randy Foye. They traded away Brandon Roy in the draft-night trade.
Vorkunov: I don’t know which is the most egregious, but every example of a team losing out at the end of the season is like a beautiful snowflake. The problem is that if you get too many of them, after a while you’re stuck in a snowstorm.
What do you think of the ideas the NBA is reportedly discussing — an earlier date to lock the lottery odds, making it so teams can’t be at the top of the lottery multiple times in a row and limiting the ways traded draft picks can be protected?
Jones: I think my favorite is teams not being allowed to be at the top of the lottery multiple times. I don’t think the other stuff is feasible or should become actual rules. But the repeat lottery winners the one that I think is the most fair for the overall health of the league.
I don’t think the San Antonio Spurs should be able to have an opportunity to draft Dylan Harper one season after having the opportunity to draft Stephen Castle, one season after having the opportunity to draft Victor Wembanyama. In the first two cases, they moved up from their initial lottery odds. If a team moves up once, then that’s well and good. But the type of luck the Spurs have enjoyed in three of the last four years makes it seem intentional, even if we all know that it isn’t.
Koreen: As a whole, these are half-measures. That sounds like a criticism, and it is, but I recognize it as inevitable. The NBA is trying to balance many priorities and is clearly worried about overcorrecting. I am sure the league does not want to eradicate hope for lesser franchises and fears that any extreme solution to tanking would do just that.
I believe limiting how often a team can finish in the top three or five of the lottery is a positive step. I would go further but I think that could be part of a better solution than the one they have now.
I’m less sold on the other potential fixes. Changing the date the odds lock would only change when teams will accept losing, not if they will. While restricting the nature of protections would limit the number of tanking inflection points, there will still be teams willing to throw away parts of seasons so long as you get a better chance at the top picks with more losses. Also, that would do little to curb the worst teams from embracing seasons-long rebuilds.
Vorkunov: I think the NBA has to solve for a very particular kind of problem here, not solve tanking. It’s trying to solve tanking to prevent it from being weaponized by sports gamblers. That, to me, is different than finally getting rid of tanking. (Though if I’m being cynical, maybe now the NBA can use the political capital to push through the kind of sweeping changes it might not have been able to otherwise.)
This particular problem is about getting rid of moments where information about players sitting that’s gained minutes or hours ahead of the public can be used to make wagers on the teams involved. That’s different from a team putting it on easy mode after the All-Star break. One is a macro choice. Another is a repetitive set of micro choices. (Yes, I know there’s overlap.) Those probably can have different solutions.
What is your ideal fix to tanking?
Jones: Give the teams with the worst records the best shot at securing the highest picks. But those teams can’t secure high picks in consecutive seasons — let’s call it top four. If a team knows that there are fewer bites at the apple, it will theoretically put more of a priority on trying to win games.
The Jazz are facing one of the biggest such conundrums that I’ve seen. They are clearly a team that is currently capable of making the Play-In within the Western Conference, and maybe competing for as high as the No. 8 spot. They owe their first-round pick, top-eight protected, to the Oklahoma City Thunder, in what is a historically good draft. So, what do they do? Do they continue to play at the level they are capable? Or do they take their foot off the pedal?
The NBA will be watching how they behave.
Koreen: There should be no incentive to lose — ever.
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Every team that does not make the second round of the playoffs has an equal chance in the lottery. However, there is no link between record and draft order. All 22 of those slots are drawn, as opposed to the current lottery, which determines just the top four spots.
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In addition, any team picking in the top five is ineligible to pick in the top five the following season. Any team that wins the first pick is ineligible to pick in the top five for two seasons, and first for five seasons.
The crux of this is no team, in my mind, is going to pass up on a chance to make the second round of the playoffs for a 1-in-22 shot at winning a lottery. However, I can see a potential Play-In team prioritizing a 1-in-14 shot at the lottery over making the playoffs and probably losing to a much better team in the first round.
Vorkunov: I think some of these ideas still apply here. Getting rid of the draft would certainly be interesting and could create a new kind of transaction cycle the NBA could exploit and market to maybe bring a new, vibrant form of free agency, since the current version is kind of zapped. Think of the NBA’s version of college’s national signing day. There are many different ways the league could construct draft free agency that still affords the worst teams an advantage (that’s the whole point of the draft) without recreating the current incentive structure.
But, as I said earlier, the NBA needs to solve for the sports-gambling-specific version of this problem. I’d love to see the draft go, but that might be too big a solution for this. I think limiting pick protections is a simple way to fix tanking. Only allowing picks to be protected top-four and top-14 (and maybe top-one) kind of takes things out of a team’s control and makes the choice more binary — i.e. whether you’re in the playoffs or not. The lottery odds are flatter now, so there’s little difference between owning the fourth-worst record and the eighth.
I think one out-there approach would involve the NBA and teams to break kayfabe when explaining why they’re sitting players. If a team can admit that it’s sitting out its best players way ahead of time, then it’s harder to bet on those games with insider information. If, say, the Pacers decide they want to optimize their luck in the draft lottery and sit Pascal Siakam, they should be able to announce on March 4 that Siakam will sit the rest of the season instead of having this prolonged dance about whether he’s playing from night to night. Or, maybe the Kings decide they’ll sit most of their starters in a certain game, then allow them to announce it a week ahead of time. If the goal is to cut down, or eliminate, the windows of time gamblers are trying to take advantage of, it pays to be as out in front and transparent as possible.
Play devil’s advocate to your own proposal: What would be the push back?
Jones: The pushback to my proposal would be to ask the question of what about the Utah Jazz? Or the Oklahoma City Thunder? Those are teams that can’t go out on the free-agency market and improve, like, say, the Los Angeles Lakers or the New York Knicks. Their only recourse is to horde a bunch of draft picks, find a great talent at the top of the lottery, and then draft well around that top-three pick.
The Jazz have drafted well around the top three — point guard Keyonte George has emerged as an All-Star candidate. But they haven’t gotten a top-three pick in their current rebuild.
The Thunder have done both. They struck gold late in the lottery with Jalen Williams. They struck gold in the top three with Chet Holmgren.
Koreen: It would make it too hard for bad teams to get better. Any plan that disconnects the tie between losing and draft slot will be ripe for that criticism. I see that as a feature, not a bug, but I understand how it could create a sense of “This will never get better” for fans of teams languishing near the bottom of the standings. However, if such a system means teams will be less likely to trade their best players for lottery tickets, I believe fewer teams will be as far away from success as they are today.
Additionally, this idea would likely cut down on transactions, which often dominate the NBA news cycle. See above: If it results in more players spending longer with their teams, great. Maybe there are more player-for-player trades driven by fit instead of weighing the present versus the future. And even with the risk teams would be taking by trading future picks, a) they could still protect them; and b) those competing for championships would still make “go for it” trades.
Vorkunov: Well, you can’t get rid of the draft because it’s been around for decades and is a television show. (All TV shows get canceled eventually, except for Sesame Street, thankfully.) Allowing early player shutdowns would probably just be a bad look for the league. If you thought load management (which at least had a sports science component) invited criticism, wait until fans start tagging the league for openly sitting good players so teams can be worse versions of themselves. Some teams won’t like limited pick protections — I’ve spoken to some front office executives already who don’t — because complexity is their job, but these are the tough choices the NBA is paid to make. It would also be a long-term problem because the first year with no encumbered picks is the 2033 draft.
Otherwise, these ideas are genius, and I see no downside, obviously.
By Eric Koreen, Mike Vorkunov, Tony Jones, via The Athletic