By Eric Koreen, Mike Vorkunov, Tony Jones | The Athletic, 2025-12-29 11:00:41
全明星周末还没到，NBA就已经开始直面摆烂问题了。
据报道，联盟正在考虑修改规则，以遏制球队的摆烂行为，这部分是为应对本赛季最大的新闻之一——博彩丑闻。当然，摆烂行为早在联盟与合法体育博彩合作之前就已存在，并且除了博彩因素外，联盟还有很多其他理由去打消球队放弃比赛或整个赛季的念头。
然而，联盟在最近的理事会会议上提出了几个选项，这无疑是迈出了一大步。The Athletic 的记者托尼·琼斯 (Tony Jones)、埃里克·科林 (Eric Koreen) 和迈克·沃库诺夫 (Mike Vorkunov) 共同探讨了摆烂问题的本质、联盟的提案以及其他可能采取的措施，以阻止或最大限度地减少输球带来的激励。
摆烂问题到底有多严重？
琼斯： 我认为这是一个中等程度的问题。它并非联盟面临的最大难题，但我同意联盟或许应该进行某种形式的改革。当前的制度不鼓励那些自认没有真正竞争力的球队去争胜。但我认为，这个问题背后最大的症结在于小市场球队缺乏其他出路。
如果犹他爵士队拥有5000万美元的薪金空间，但由于市场本身的性质，他们无法利用这些空间来吸引人才，那么他们提升实力的唯一途径就是通过选秀。而对他们来说，这就意味着摆烂。联盟中有多个市场面临同样的问题，这也在全联盟范围内产生了影响。
科林： 在我个人看来，这个问题的严重性仅次于球员出勤率，而出勤率本身也是摆烂的一个重要组成部分。无论从理念上还是实践上，我都反对任何鼓励输球的行为。首先，这是职业体育，争取胜利应该是至高无上的。任何因不争胜而获得的好处都应被根除。球迷们不应该去纠结他们支持的球队到底是赢球好还是输球好。
如果球队不是经常试图利用这一点，这本不成问题。但我们已经看到，为了所谓的长远利益，有些球队会放弃整个赛季（如奇才队、爵士队）、部分赛季（如76人队、篮网队）或者只是在赛季末段选择性地放弃一些比赛（如独行侠队）。这导致了整个三月份的比赛都缺乏竞争力，这更加凸显了问题的严重性。
沃库诺夫： 我认为这个问题没有我们想象的那么严重，但它本不应如此猖獗。过去一些著名的“摆烂大师”行事相当明目张胆，我想这让我们所有人都变成了怀疑论者。
摆烂造成了两个大问题。一个是比赛本身的质量，另一个是信任危机。当球队不努力争胜时，这项运动在那些城市的价值就会降低，对他们的对手来说也是如此。胜利本应是第一要务，因此为球队和球迷创造一种反向激励机制是有问题的。如果你看比赛是希望你的主队输球，那你为什么还要看比赛呢？
对我来说，信任危机源于球员因伤病或其他原因缺阵，而我们很难相信这些理由是真实的。这可能导致对联盟其他方面的信任度下降。
你见过最明目张胆的摆烂案例是什么？
琼斯： 上赛季爵士队在大部分时间里雪藏劳里·马尔卡宁 (Lauri Markkanen) 和沃克·凯斯勒 (Walker Kessler) 的做法显然是大家热议的焦点。但犹他并非唯一这样做的球队。俄克拉荷马城雷霆队在多个赛季中长期让谢伊·吉尔杰斯-亚历山大 (Shai Gilgeous-Alexander) 休战的行为同样明目张胆——而且显然奏效了。
金州勇士队那次为得到哈里森·巴恩斯 (Harrison Barnes) 而进行的摆烂也是显而易见的。我甚至见过洛杉矶快船队在2022年为进入犹他爵士队所在的季后赛半区而故意输球——当时爵士队是西部头号种子。这说明公开摆烂甚至不仅限于为了选秀顺位。
科林： 我选择不回答我自己提出的问题，而是分享一个我最喜欢的摆烂案例。人们常说，摆烂的是管理层，而不是教练和球员。2005-06赛季的明尼苏达森林狼队需要让他们的选秀权落在前十才能保留它。在最后一场比赛中，计划的一部分是让角色球员前锋马克·马德森 (Mark Madsen) 上场30分钟，全场15投1中，三分线外7投0中。那场比赛的三分出手数占了他整个职业生涯三分出手总数的43.8%。在他其他9个赛季的452场比赛中，他总共只投了9次三分。
不知何故，那场比赛还是被拖入了加时赛，但明尼苏达最终还是成功输掉了比赛。森林狼队保住了他们的选秀权，最终得到了兰迪·弗耶 (Randy Foye)。而在选秀夜的交易中，他们送走了布兰登·罗伊 (Brandon Roy)。
沃库诺夫： 我不知道哪个是最明目张胆的，但每个球队在赛季末输球的例子都像一片美丽的雪花。问题是，当雪花积得太多，你就会陷入一场暴风雪之中。
你如何看待据报道NBA正在讨论的几项提议——比如提前锁定乐透抽签概率的日期、禁止球队连续多年获得乐透区高顺位签，以及限制交易选秀权的保护方式？
琼斯： 我最喜欢的是禁止球队连续多年获得乐透区高顺位签。我认为其他提议要么不可行，要么不应该成为正式规则。但禁止连续赢得乐透签这一条，我认为对联盟的整体健康发展最为公平。
我不认为圣安东尼奥马刺队应该在有机会选中维克托·文班亚马 (Victor Wembanyama) 之后，又有机会选中斯蒂芬·卡斯尔，再之后还有机会选中迪伦·哈珀 (Dylan Harper)。在前两个案例中，他们的顺位都超过了最初的乐透概率。如果一支球队有一次顺位跃升，那很好。但马刺队在过去四年中有三年都享受到这种好运，这让事情看起来像是有意为之，尽管我们都知道事实并非如此。
科林： 总的来说，这些都只是治标不治本的半吊子措施。这听起来像是在批评，事实也的确如此，但我承认这是不可避免的。NBA试图在多个优先事项之间取得平衡，并且明显担心矫枉过正。我敢肯定，联盟不希望扼杀弱队的希望，也担心任何极端的摆烂解决方案会适得其反。
我相信，限制一支球队进入乐透区前三或前五的次数是积极的一步。我甚至会更进一步，但我认为这可以作为现有方案的一个改进部分。
我对其他潜在的修复方案不太感冒。更改锁定概率的日期只会改变球队开始摆烂的时间，而不会改变他们是否会摆烂。虽然限制选秀权保护的性质会减少一些触发摆烂的关键节点，但只要输球越多获得状元签的机会就越大，就总会有球队愿意放弃部分赛季。而且，这对于遏制那些最差球队进行长达数个赛季的重建也收效甚微。
沃库诺夫： 我认为NBA在这里需要解决的是一个非常具体的问题，而不是彻底解决摆烂问题。联盟试图解决摆烂是为了防止其被体育博彩玩家利用。在我看来，这与彻底根除摆烂是两码事。（不过，如果我愤世嫉俗一点，也许现在NBA可以利用这股东风，推动那些在其他情况下可能无法通过的彻底改革。）
这个特定问题在于，要消除那种“比公众提前几分钟或几小时获得球员休战信息，并利用该信息对相关球队下注”的情况。这与一支球队在全明星周末后就开启“养生模式”是不同的。一个是宏观选择，另一个则是一系列重复的微观选择。（是的，我知道两者有重叠。）它们可能需要不同的解决方案。
你认为根治摆烂的理想方案是什么？
琼斯： 让战绩最差的球队有最高的机会获得最高顺位的选秀权。但这些球队不能连续多个赛季获得高顺位签——比如前四顺位。如果一支球队知道（获得高顺位签的）机会变少了，理论上他们就会更重视赢下比赛。
爵士队正面临着我见过的最棘手的两难处境之一。他们显然是一支有能力在西部联盟打进附加赛，甚至可能争夺高达第8名位置的球队。但他们欠俄克拉荷马城雷霆队一个首轮签，这个签位是前八顺位保护的，而今年又是一个历史级的选秀大年。所以，他们该怎么做？是继续发挥出应有的水平？还是放慢脚步？
NBA会密切关注他们的动向。
科林： 任何时候都不应该有输球的激励。
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所有未能进入季后赛第二轮的球队在乐透抽签中拥有均等的机会。然而，战绩与选秀顺位之间没有任何关联。所有22个顺位都通过抽签决定，而不是像现在这样只决定前四位。
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此外，任何在前五顺位选秀的球队，在接下来的一个赛季中都没有资格再次进入前五顺位。任何赢得状元签的球队，在接下来的两个赛季中都没有资格进入前五顺位，且五年内不能再获得状元签。
这个方案的核心在于，在我看来，没有球队会为了22分之一的乐透中奖机会而放弃进入季后赛第二轮。然而，我能预见到，一支有附加赛潜力的球队，可能会优先考虑14分之一的乐透中奖机会，而不是去打季后赛，然后在首轮大概率输给一支强得多的球队。
沃库诺夫： 我认为这里面的一些想法仍然适用。取消选秀制度肯定会很有趣，可能会创造一种新的交易周期，NBA可以利用和推广这种周期，或许能带来一种充满活力的新形式的自由球员市场，因为现有的自由市场有点死气沉沉。可以想象一下NBA版的大学“全国签约日”。联盟可以设计出许多不同的选秀自由市场模式，同时仍然给予战绩最差的球队优势（这正是选秀的初衷），而不会重蹈当前激励机制的覆辙。
但是，正如我之前所说，NBA需要解决的是专门针对体育博彩的摆烂问题。我很想看到选秀制度被取消，但对于这个问题来说，这个解决方案可能太大了。我认为限制选秀权保护是解决摆烂的一个简单方法。只允许选秀权进行前四和前十四顺位（或许还有状元签）的保护，这在某种程度上让事情脱离了球队的控制，使选择变得更加二元化——即你是否进入季后赛。现在的乐透概率更加扁平化，所以战绩倒数第四和倒数第八之间差别不大。
我有一个比较大胆的想法，那就是NBA和各支球队在解释为何让球员休战时，可以打破行业默契，坦诚相告。如果一支球队能提前很长时间承认他们是为了战略目的让最好的球员休战，那么利用内幕信息对这些比赛下注就会变得更加困难。比如说，如果步行者队决定为了优化他们的乐透抽签运气而让帕斯卡尔·西亚卡姆 (Pascal Siakam) 休战，他们应该可以在3月4日就宣布西亚卡姆将缺席本赛季剩余比赛，而不是每晚都上演一场他是否上场的拉锯战。又或者，国王队决定在某场比赛中让大部分主力休息，那么就允许他们提前一周宣布。如果目标是缩短或消除博彩玩家试图利用的时间窗口，那么尽可能地提前和透明化是有益的。
为你自己的提案扮演一次“魔鬼代言人”：它会遇到什么阻力？
琼斯： 对我提案的阻力会是这样一个问题：那像犹他爵士队或俄克拉荷马城雷霆队这样的球队怎么办？这些球队无法像洛杉矶湖人队或纽约尼克斯队那样，通过自由球员市场来提升实力。他们唯一的出路就是囤积大量的选秀权，在乐透区高位找到一位天才球员，然后围绕这位前三顺位新秀进行出色的选秀。
爵士队在前三顺位之外的选秀做得很好——控球后卫基扬特·乔治 (Keyonte George) 已经成长为一名全明星候选人。但他们在当前的重建中还没有得到过前三顺位的选秀权。
雷霆队则两者兼得。他们在乐透区末段用杰伦·威廉姆斯 (Jalen Williams) 淘到了宝。他们又在前三顺位用切特·霍姆格伦 (Chet Holmgren) 淘到了宝。
科林： 这会让差队变得更难以翻身。任何将输球与选秀顺位脱钩的方案都很容易招致这样的批评。我认为这是有意为之的特点，而非一个缺陷，但我理解这可能会给那些在积分榜底部挣扎的球队的球迷带来一种“永无出头之日”的感觉。然而，如果这样的体系意味着球队不太可能为了乐透签而交易掉他们最好的球员，我相信未来像现在这样远离成功的球队会更少。
此外，这个想法可能会减少交易，而交易新闻常常主导着NBA的新闻周期。如上所述：如果这能让更多球员在同一支球队效力更长时间，那很好。也许会有更多基于阵容适配度的球员换球员的交易，而不是权衡当下与未来。即使球队交易未来选秀权会承担风险，但a)他们仍然可以对其进行保护；b)那些争夺总冠军的球队仍然会进行“全力一搏”的交易。
沃库诺夫： 嗯，你不能取消选秀，因为它已经存在了几十年，而且本身就是一档电视节目。（不过所有电视节目最终都会被取消，谢天谢地，《芝麻街》除外。）允许球员提前“关机休战”可能会对联盟形象不利。如果你认为负荷管理（至少还有体育科学的成分）都会招致批评，那就等着看吧，当球迷们开始因为联盟公开让优秀球员休战，只为让球队变得更差而口诛笔伐时会是怎样一番景象。一些球队不会喜欢受限的选秀权保护——我已经和一些管理层高管聊过，他们不喜欢——因为处理复杂问题正是他们的工作职责，但这些都是NBA需要做出的艰难抉择。这也会是一个长期问题，因为第一个没有任何受牵制的选秀权的年份是2033年选秀。
除此之外，这些想法简直是天才之作，显然我没看到任何缺点。
由生成式人工智能翻译，译文内容可能不准确或不完整，以原文为准。
点击查看原文：Can NBA’s new proposals fix tanking? Is it even worth it for the league to try?
Can NBA’s new proposals fix tanking? Is it even worth it for the league to try?
It’s not even the All-Star break, and the NBA is already opening itself up to the tanking question.
According to reports, the league is considering rule changes to discourage teams from accepting losing, partly a response to the gambling scandal that has been one of the top stories of this season. Of course, tanking predates the league’s tie-in with legal sports gambling, and there are many reasons beyond wagering for the NBA to want to disincentivize teams from punting on games or seasons.
However, the league presenting a few options at a recent board of governors meeting is a big step. The Athletic’s Tony Jones, Eric Koreen and Mike Vorkunov discussed the nature of the problem, the proposals and other steps the league could take to stop or minimize the incentive to lose.
How big of a problem is tanking?
Jones: I think it’s a moderate issue. I don’t think it’s the biggest issue the league faces, but I don’t disagree that the league could probably use some reform of sorts. The setup now discourages teams from trying to win if they don’t truly think they can compete. But I think the biggest issue inside the issue is the lack of any other recourse for small-market teams.
If the Utah Jazz have $50 million in cap space, but, because of the nature of the market, can’t use that space in order to attract talent, then their only road to improvement is through the draft. And for them, that means tanking. There are multiple markets that face that same issue, and that has an affect across the league.
Koreen: It’s second on my personal list behind player availability, which is a big part of tanking. I am both philosophically and practically opposed to incentivizing losing. With the former: This is professional sports, and trying to win should be paramount. Any benefit for not doing that should be eradicated. Fans should not have to wonder whether it’s better for their favorite teams to win or lose.
If teams weren’t trying to exploit this regularly, it wouldn’t be an issue. But we’ve seen teams throw away seasons at a time (the Wizards, Jazz), portions of a season (76ers, Nets) or just select games at the end of the season (Mavericks) in the name of long-term interests. That it makes a whole month of the season uncompetitive only underscores the importance of the issue.
Vorkunov: I think it’s less of an issue than we think, but more than it should be. Some of the great tank commanders of years past have been pretty flagrant, and I think that has created cynics out of all of us.
Tanking has created these two big problems. There’s one problem, which is the on-court product, and another, which is the trust problem. When teams are trying not to win, it devalues the sport in those cities and also for the other teams they play. Winning should be paramount, so creating an inverse incentive structure for organizations and fans is troublesome. If you’re watching games hoping your team will lose, then why watch the games at all?
The trust problem, to me, comes from how players get held out with injuries or whatever reason, and it’s hard to trust that those reasons are true. That can lead to a lack of trust in the rest of the product.
What is the most egregious example of tanking you’ve seen?
Jones: The Jazz shelving Lauri Markkanen and Walker Kessler for large chunks of last season is obviously what’s being talked about. But Utah is hardly the only team that has done this. Oklahoma City sitting Shai Gilgeous-Alexander for large chunks of multiple seasons was egregious — and it obviously worked.
Golden State’s tank job that landed them Harrison Barnes was apparent. I once saw the Los Angeles Clippers tank a playoff spot in 2022 so they could get into Utah’s side of the bracket, when the Jazz were the No. 1 seed in the Western Conference, so that’s even an example of open tanking not being limited to draft position.
Koreen: I’ll choose to not answer the question I made up and instead describe my favorite example of tanking. It’s often said that front offices tank, while coaches and players don’t. The 2005-06 Minnesota Timberwolves needed to have their draft pick land in the top 10 to retain it. In the final game, that plan involved journeyman forward Mark Madsen playing 30 minutes to go 1 of 15 from the field and 0 of 7 from 3. That game accounted for 43.8 percent of his career 3-point attempts. He took nine 3s in his other 452 games across nine seasons.
Somehow, that game still went to overtime, with Minnesota eventually pulling out the loss. The Wolves kept their pick, eventually winding up with Randy Foye. They traded away Brandon Roy in the draft-night trade.
Vorkunov: I don’t know which is the most egregious, but every example of a team losing out at the end of the season is like a beautiful snowflake. The problem is that if you get too many of them, after a while you’re stuck in a snowstorm.
What do you think of the ideas the NBA is repoprtedly discussing — an earlier date to lock the lottery odds, making it so teams can’t be at the top of the lottery multiple times in a row and limiting the ways traded draft picks can be protected?
Jones: I think my favorite is teams not being allowed to be at the top of the lottery multiple times. I don’t think the other stuff is feasible or should become actual rules. But the repeat lottery winners the one that I think is the most fair for the overall health of the league.
I don’t think the San Antonio Spurs should be able to have an opportunity to draft Dylan Harper one season after having the opportunity to draft Stephen Castle, one season after having the opportunity to draft Victor Wembanyama. In the first two cases, they moved up from their initial lottery odds. If a team moves up once, then that’s well and good. But the type of luck the Spurs have enjoyed in three of the last four years makes it seem intentional, even if we all know that it isn’t.
Koreen: As a whole, these are half-measures. That sounds like a criticism, and it is, but I recognize it as inevitable. The NBA is trying to balance many priorities and is clearly worried about overcorrecting. I am sure the league does not want to eradicate hope for lesser franchises and fears that any extreme solution to tanking would do just that.
I believe limiting how often a team can finish in the top three or five of the lottery is a positive step. I would go further but I think that could be part of a better solution than the one they have now.
I’m less sold on the other potential fixes. Changing the date the odds lock would only change when teams will accept losing, not if they will. While restricting the nature of protections would limit the number of tanking inflection points, there will still be teams willing to throw away parts of seasons so long as you get a better chance at the top picks with more losses. Also, that would do little to curb the worst teams from embracing seasons-long rebuilds.
Vorkunov: I think the NBA has to solve for a very particular kind of problem here, not solve tanking. It’s trying to solve tanking to prevent it from being weaponized by sports gamblers. That, to me, is different than finally getting rid of tanking. (Though if I’m being cynical, maybe now the NBA can use the political capital to push through the kind of sweeping changes it might not have been able to otherwise.)
This particular problem is about getting rid of moments where information about players sitting that’s gained minutes or hours ahead of the public can be used to make wagers on the teams involved. That’s different from a team putting it on easy mode after the All-Star break. One is a macro choice. Another is a repetitive set of micro choices. (Yes, I know there’s overlap.) Those probably can have different solutions.
What is your ideal fix to tanking?
Jones: Give the teams with the worst records the best shot at securing the highest picks. But those teams can’t secure high picks in consecutive seasons — let’s call it top four. If a team knows that there are fewer bites at the apple, it will theoretically put more of a priority on trying to win games.
The Jazz are facing one of the biggest such conundrums that I’ve seen. They are clearly a team that is currently capable of making the Play-In within the Western Conference, and maybe competing for as high as the No. 8 spot. They owe their first-round pick, top-eight protected, to the Oklahoma City Thunder, in what is a historically good draft. So, what do they do? Do they continue to play at the level they are capable? Or do they take their foot off the pedal?
The NBA will be watching how they behave.
Koreen: There should be no incentive to lose — ever.
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Every team that does not make the second round of the playoffs has an equal chance in the lottery. However, there is no link between record and draft order. All 22 of those slots are drawn, as opposed to the current lottery, which determines just the top four spots.
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In addition, any team picking in the top five is ineligible to pick in the top five the following season. Any team that wins the first pick is ineligible to pick in the top five for two seasons, and first for five seasons.
The crux of this is no team, in my mind, is going to pass up on a chance to make the second round of the playoffs for a 1-in-22 shot at winning a lottery. However, I can see a potential Play-In team prioritizing a 1-in-14 shot at the lottery over making the playoffs and probably losing to a much better team in the first round.
Vorkunov: I think some of these ideas still apply here. Getting rid of the draft would certainly be interesting and could create a new kind of transaction cycle the NBA could exploit and market to maybe bring a new, vibrant form of free agency, since the current version is kind of zapped. Think of the NBA’s version of college’s national signing day. There are many different ways the league could construct draft free agency that still affords the worst teams an advantage (that’s the whole point of the draft) without recreating the current incentive structure.
But, as I said earlier, the NBA needs to solve for the sports-gambling-specific version of this problem. I’d love to see the draft go, but that might be too big a solution for this. I think limiting pick protections is a simple way to fix tanking. Only allowing picks to be protected top-four and top-14 (and maybe top-one) kind of takes things out of a team’s control and makes the choice more binary — i.e. whether you’re in the playoffs or not. The lottery odds are flatter now, so there’s little difference between owning the fourth-worst record and the eighth.
I think one out-there approach would involve the NBA and teams to break kayfabe when explaining why they’re sitting players. If a team can admit that it’s sitting out its best players way ahead of time, then it’s harder to bet on those games with insider information. If, say, the Pacers decide they want to optimize their luck in the draft lottery and sit Pascal Siakam, they should be able to announce on March 4 that Siakam will sit the rest of the season instead of having this prolonged dance about whether he’s playing from night to night. Or, maybe the Kings decide they’ll sit most of their starters in a certain game, then allow them to announce it a week ahead of time. If the goal is to cut down, or eliminate, the windows of time gamblers are trying to take advantage of, it pays to be as out in front and transparent as possible.
Play devil’s advocate to your own proposal: What would be the push back?
Jones: The pushback to my proposal would be to ask the question of what about the Utah Jazz? Or the Oklahoma City Thunder? Those are teams that can’t go out on the free-agency market and improve, like, say, the Los Angeles Lakers or the New York Knicks. Their only recourse is to horde a bunch of draft picks, find a great talent at the top of the lottery, and then draft well around that top-three pick.
The Jazz have drafted well around the top three — point guard Keyonte George has emerged as an All-Star candidate. But they haven’t gotten a top-three pick in their current rebuild.
The Thunder have done both. They struck gold late in the lottery with Jalen Williams. They struck gold in the top three with Chet Holmgren.
Koreen: It would make it too hard for bad teams to get better. Any plan that disconnects the tie between losing and draft slot will be ripe for that criticism. I see that as a feature, not a bug, but I understand how it could create a sense of “This will never get better” for fans of teams languishing near the bottom of the standings. However, if such a system means teams will be less likely to trade their best players for lottery tickets, I believe fewer teams will be as far away from success as they are today.
Additionally, this idea would likely cut down on transactions, which often dominate the NBA news cycle. See above: If it results in more players spending longer with their teams, great. Maybe there are more player-for-player trades driven by fit instead of weighing the present versus the future. And even with the risk teams would be taking by trading future picks, a) they could still protect them; and b) those competing for championships would still make “go for it” trades.
Vorkunov: Well, you can’t get rid of the draft because it’s been around for decades and is a television show. (All TV shows get canceled eventually, except for Sesame Street, thankfully.) Allowing early player shutdowns would probably just be a bad look for the league. If you thought load management (which at least had a sports science component) invited criticism, wait until fans start tagging the league for openly sitting good players so teams can be worse versions of themselves. Some teams won’t like limited pick protections — I’ve spoken to some front office executives already who don’t — because complexity is their job, but these are the tough choices the NBA is paid to make. It would also be a long-term problem because the first year with no encumbered picks is the 2033 draft.
Otherwise, these ideas are genius, and I see no downside, obviously.
By Eric Koreen, Mike Vorkunov, Tony Jones, via The Athletic